Abstract
Labor and Goods Markets
At the beginning of each period N e jt new firms enter into sector j ∈ (0, 1), while at the end of the period a fraction δ ∈ (0, 1) of market participants exits from the market for exogenous reasons. 5 As a result, the number of firms in a sector N jt , follows the equation of motion:
where N e jt is the number of new entrants in sector j at time t. Following BGM (2012) we assume that new entrants at time t will only start producing at time t + 1 and that the probability of exit from the market, δ, is independent of the period of entry and identical across sectors. The assumption of an exogenous constant exit rate in adopted for tractability, but it also has empirical support. Using U.S. annual data on manufacturing, Lee and Mukoyama (2007) find that, while the entry rate is procyclical, annual exit rates are similar across booms and recessions. Below we describe the entry process and the mode of competition within in each sector in detail. For simplicity, we assume that entry requires a fixed cost ψ in units of the final good, which is common across sectors. 6 The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions, as in Andolfatto (1996) and Mertz (1995) . t is the total number of vacancies created at time t and u t is the unemployment rate. The probability that a firm fills a vacancy is given by q t = mt v tot t , while the probability to find a job for an unemployed worker reads as z t = mt u t . Firms and individuals take both probabilities as given. Matches become productive in the same period in which they are formed. Each firm separates exogenously from a fraction 1 − ̺ of existing workers each period, where ̺ is the probability that a worker stays with a firm until the next period. As a result a worker may separate from a job for two reasons: either because the firm where the job is located exits from the market or because the match is destroyed. Since these sources of separation are independent, the evolution of aggregate employment, L t , is given by
Notice that u t = 1 − L t−1 also represents the fraction of agents searching for a job. other against the risk of being unemployed. The representative family has lifetime utility:
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, the variable h t represents individual hours worked 1 and C t is the consumption of the final good. The family receives real labor income w t h t L t , 2 where w t is the real wage, and profits Π t from the ownership of firms. Unemployed individuals 3 receive a real unemployment benefit b, hence the overall benefit for the household is b (1 − L t ).
4
This is financed through lump sum taxation by the government. Notice that the household 5 recognizes that employment is determined by the flows of its members into and out of 6 employment according to
The household chooses how much to save in riskless bonds and in the creation of new firms through the stock market according to standard Euler and asset pricing equations. The first order condition (FOC) with respect to employment, L t , is
where Γ t is the marginal value to the household of having one member employed rather than 8 unemployed and 1/C t is the marginal utility of consumption. Equation (5) indicates that 9 the household's shadow value of one additional employed member (the left hand side) has 10 four components: first, the increase in utility generated by having an additional member 11 employed, given by the real wage expressed in utils; second, the decrease in utility due to 12 more hours dedicated to work, given by the marginal disutility of employment; third the 13 foregone utility value of the unemployment benefit b/C t ; fourth, the continuation utility value, given by the contribution of a current match to next period household's employment. In the online Appendix we report the details of the derivations.
Firms and Technology

1
The final good is produced aggregating a continuum of measure one of sectoral goods 2 according to the function
where Y jt denotes output of sector j and ω is the elasticity of subsitutution between any 4 two different sectoral goods. The final good producer behave competitively. In each sector 5 j, there are N jt > 1 firms producing differentiated goods that are aggregated into a sectoral 6 good by a CES aggregating function defined as
where y jt (i) is the production of good i in sector j, ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between sectoral goods and Φ jt = N , such that Φ jt = 1. In this case the degree of LOV depends just on the elasticity of substitution between goods, as in BGM (2012) and in the bulk of the literature using CES functional forms. In the second case the LOV effect is removed by setting τ = 0, such that Φ jt = N 1 1−ε jt . As in Colciago and Etro (2010 a), we assume a unit elasticity of substitution between goods belonging to different sectors. This allows to realistically separate limited substitutability at the aggregated level, and high substitutability at the disaggregated level. Each firm i in sector j produces a differentiated good with the following production function
where A t represents technology which is common across sectors and evolves exogenously over time. Variable n jt (i) is firm i's time-t workforce and h jt (i) represents hours per employee.
Period-t real profits of a firm are defined as
where w jt (i) is the real wage paid by firm i, v jt (i) represents the number of vacancies posted at time t and κ is the output cost of keeping a vacancy open. Notice that ρ jt (i) is the price of firm i's output expressed in units of the final good. The value of a firm is the expected discounted value of its future profits
where
is the households' stochastic discount factor which takes into account that firms' survival probability is 1 − δ. Firms which do not exit from the market have a time-t individual workforce given by
The unit intersectoral elasticity of substitution implies that the nominal expenditure, EXP t , is identical across sectors. Thus, the final producer's demand for each sectoral good is
where P jt is the price index of sector j and P t is the price of the final good at period t.
Denoting with p jt (i) the price of good i in sector j, the demand faced by the producer of 2 each variant is
where P jt is defined as
Using (13) and (12) the individual demand of good i can be written as a function of aggregate expenditure,
As technology, the entry cost and the exit probability are identical across sectors, in what follows we drop the index j and refer to a representative sector. As a result In what follows we distinguish between producers according to their period of entry. We define as new firms those producing units which entered the market in period t − 1 and at time t produce for the first time. 9 The term incumbent firms refers, instead, to producers which entered the market in period t − 2 
Bertrand Competition
where the markup over the marginal cost is given by
The latter is decreasing in the number of firms in the sector , with an elasticity
. Further, when N t → ∞ the markup tends to ε/(ε − 1), i.e. the traditional one under monopolistic competition. Also, it is decreasing in the degree of substitutability between products ε, with an elasticity
, and vanishes in case of perfect substitutability: lim ε→∞ µ t (ε, N t ) = 1. In equilibrium firms set the same prices, hence equation (14) implies that the relative price is also identical across producers and reads as
In the case the LOV effect is removed, that is when τ = 0, it follows that ρ t (ε,
Recall that just a fraction (1 − δ) of time t-1 entrants start producing in period t.
return to the implications of this aspect below, when discussing the quantitative performance of the model. 10 The first order condition (FOC) with respect to vacancies reads as
Thus, the firm sets the value of the marginal worker, φ t , equal to the expected cost of hiring the worker, κ qt
. The FOC with respect to employment reads as
Condition (19) implies that the value of the marginal worker is represented by the profits associated to the additional worker, the term in brackets, plus the continuation value. Next period, with probability ̺ the match is not severed. In this event the firm obtains the future expected value of a job. Combining the latter two equations delivers the Job Creation
where we used the pricing condition to substitute for mc t = ρ t µ t . Since the ratio
in the number of firms, it follows that competition leads to a rise in the marginal cost and be, respectively, the real profits and the number of vacancies posted by a new firm. Symmetrically, π t and v t define, respectively, the individual profits and vacancies 10 To lighten notation, in the remainder we neglect the dependance of ρ t and µ t from ε and N t .
posted by an incumbent producer. New firms and incumbent firms are characterized by the same size, n t . Thus, the optimal hiring policy of new firms, which have no initial workforce, consists in posting at time t as many vacancies as required to hire n t workers. As a result
. Since n t = ̺n t−1 + v t q t , it has to be the case that
Hence, a new firm posts more vacancies than an incumbent producer. For this reason, and given vacancy posting is costly, the profit of new firms are lower than those of incumbent firms. To see this, notice that
Substituting equation (21) in the latter delivers
The last equality follows from the fact that the term in the round bracket represents the 1 profits of an incumbent producer, π t . Consistently with the U.S. empirical evidence in 
Endogenous Entry
5
In each period the level of entry is determined endogenously to equate the value of a new entrant, V e t , to the entry cost
Notice that perspective new entrants have lower value than producing firms because they will have, in case they do not exit from the market before starting production, to set up a workforce in their first period of activity. The difference in the value between a firm which is already producing and a perspective entrant is, in fact, the discounted value of the higher vacancy posting cost that the latter will suffer, with respect to the former, in the first period of activity. Formally
where V t is the value of a producing firm (both new firms and incumbent firms) at time t. 
Bargaining over Wages and Hours
2
As in Trigari (2009), bargaining takes place along two dimensions: the real wage and the hours of work. We assume Nash bargaining. That is, the firm and the worker choose the wage w t and the hours of work h t to maximize the Nash product
where φ t is firm value of having an additional worker, while Γ t C t is the household's surplus expressed in units of consumption. The parameter η reflects the parties' relative bargaining power. The FOC with respect to the real wage is
Using the definition of φ t in equation (19) and that of Γ t given by equation (5), after some manipulations, yields the wage equation
where we use
. The wage shares costs and benefits associated to the match according to the parameter η. The worker is rewarded for a fraction η of the firm's revenues and savings of hiring costs and compensated for a fraction 1−η of the disutility he suffers from supplying labor and the foregone unemployment benefits. A distinguishing feature of our approach is that the wage depends on the degree of competition in the goods market. The direct effect of competition on the real wage is captured through the term η ρ t µ t A t h t , which represents the share of the MRP which goes to workers. As discussed above, entry leads to an increase in the ratio
and hence in the MRP.
Thus, everything else equal, stronger competition shifts the wage curve up. This result is similar to that in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), who find a positive effect of competition on the real wage. The FOC with respect to h t yields
Because the firm and the worker bargain simultaneously about wages and hours, the outcome 1 is (privately) efficient and the wage does not play an allocational role for hours. Stronger 
Aggregation and Market Clearing
5
Considering that sectors are symmetric and have a unit mass, the sectoral number of firms and new entrants also represents their aggregate counterpart. Thus, the dynamics of the aggregate number of firms is
The firms' individual workforce, n t , is identical across producers, hence L t = N t n t . As aggregate expenditure and sectoral expenditure are identical, it follows that
and the individual production function we obtain
In the LOV effect is allowed it follows that ρ t = N constraints of households we obtain the aggregate resource constraint of the economy
which states that the sum of consumption and investment in new entrants must equal the sum between labor income and aggregate profits, Π t , distributed to households at time t.
Aggregate profits are defined as
Goods' market clearing requires
Finally, the dynamics of aggregate employment reads as
which shows that workers employed into a firm which exits the market join the mass of un-1 employed. The on-line Appendix lists the full set of equilibrium conditions for the economy. is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process given byÂ t = ρ AÂ t−1 + ε At , where 16Â t = ln (A t /A) and ρ A ∈ (0, 1) and ε At is a white noise disturbance, with zero expected value 17 and standard deviation σ A . As standard in the literature we set the steady state marginal 18 productivity of labor, A, to 1. We calibrate the productivity process as in King and Rebelo 11 The computation of the steady state is in the online Appendix.
In the baseline parameterization we impose symmetry in bargaining and set η = with the U.S. evidence. Since we consider a labor-leisure choice, the overall replacement rate 7 is given by the sum between the unemployment insurance benefit and the disutility cost of In what follows we will study the impulse response functions to a productivity shock, 7
and then we will evaluate the second order moments. In order to disentangle the role played 8 by the entry of firms from that played by the variable markup, we compare the performance 9 of the baseline model with Bertrand competition to two alternative versions of our set up.
10
In the first one we shut down the variable markup channel by considering monopolistic of LOV in the analysis of second moments. Importantly, the calibration strategy is identical 23 across the models. In particular, the replacement rate, which is known to be relevant for the 24 propagation of technology shocks on labor market variables, is held constant across models. The technology shock creates expectations of future profits which lead to the entry of Search model. Given entry is subject to a one period time-to-build lag the total number of 11 firms, N t , does not change on impact, but builds up gradually. 13 This pattern is shared by 12 both the Entry-Only model and by the Bertrand model. In the Bertrand framework stronger 13 competition translates into a lower markup, which reaches its negative peak after few periods 14 and then gradually reverts to the steady state. 14 Relative to the Entry-Only framework, the , which in log 7 deviations amounts to ls t =ŵ t − Ŷ t −L t −ĥ t =ŵ t −Â t . The latter shows that, in log-8 linear terms, the labor share equals the difference between the real wage and productivity.
IRFs to a Technology Shock
9
Bargaining over wages implies that only a fraction η of the increase in productivity goes 10 to workers. As a resultŵ t <Â t on impact, and the labor share is countercyclical. This is 
Second Moments
21
To further assess the implications of endogenous market structures for the business cycle,
22
we compute second moments of the relevant macroeconomic variables in response to a one 23 standard deviation technology shock. In this exercise we follow the RBC literature and 24 assume that the only source of random fluctuations are exogenous productivity shocks. 
Conclusions
20
We develop a DSGE model where endogenous market structures and matching frictions 21 in the labor market interact endogenously. We account for strategic interactions among 
